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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

basis of the theory by which such an action in deceit is permissible
at all, yet works out a theory of equitable estoppel because the
infant was of the age of discretion.
A recent Illinois case 14 seems to furnish the answer, however,

when it remarks that while estoppel in pais has no application
to an infant, the infant is liable in an action in deceit and that to
save a circuity of action an infant of years of discretion should
be estopped from proceeding to regain possession of an estate
when he by his conduct induced the other to purchase it.
That, it would seem, is the burden of the principal case,
when it refuses to follow the rule of the New York cases which
deny an action to an infant who takes the initiative in an effort
to recover what he has given without restoring what he has received, yet permits the adult to set off against recovery by the
infant what the adult has lost through the infant's misrepresentation. If one dissolves the form and avoids the circuity of action,
what is the result, if not that of denying a recovery unless the infant
makes good what he enjoyed?
Massachusetts is at least consistent, for it denies the right even
to recoup in such a situation. 5
So, in conclusion, might it not be said that the temper of the
law affecting infant's right of disaffirmance is gradually changing
and that the fiction of the necessity of protection of infants, regardless of age, is becoming now narrowed down to the actual
necessities of each individual case, extending the protection only
in those cases where infancy was taken advantage of by the adult,
and denying the protection with equal rigor, where it was used by
the infant to take advantage of the adult?
ELMER M. LEESMAN.JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.- [United States]
In an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Brandeis on January 10th of

this year the Supreme Court of the United States holds: (1) That
a state court could not acquire jurisdiction of a foreign corporation,
not doing business in the state, by service of process on one of its
chief officers, while temporarily in the state on business for the
corporation; (2) that after a plea to the jurisdiction overruled on
demurrer, a plea in bar and trial on the merits did not waive the
objection.'
have entrapped third persons into purchasing it from others, or into advancing money upon it."
The court then proceeds to work out a theory of estopped of the infant
in this case by estoppel in equity, because the infant here was of "years of
discretion." This was a case where the infant, then nineteen years of age,
conveyed property to her father to enable him to borrow money on it.
240, 119 N. E. 240.
14. Keal v. Rhudderek 317 Ill.
15. Raymnond v. General Motorcycle Co. 230 Mass. 54.
1. Jamnes-Dickinson Mortgage Co. v. Harry (1927) 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308.
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This appears to be the first case settling the precise point on
jurisdiction, though the previous cases left little room for doubt
as to the holding when the question should arise.
It had been held that where a foreign corporation did no
business in the state and had no officers or agents therein, jurisdiction
could not be obtained by service of process on a public officer in
accordance with a local statute.2 It had also been held that when
a foreign corporation was not doing business in the state, jurisdiction could not be obtained by service of process on its president
while temporarily or casually in the state for his own business or
pleasure." The case 4 which comes nearest to the point involved a
claim that the president of the company was in the state on business
for the corporation, but that fact was not affirmatively found. In
the principal case the fact that the president was in the state on
business for the corporation was admitted in the pleadings. The
reasoning of the Rosenberg case goes on the ground that since the
corporation, though making purchases, etc., in the state, was not
technically doing business therein, it was not subject to its process.
"Visits on such business, even if occurring at regular intervals,

would not warrant the inference that the corporation was present
within the jurisdiction of the state. . . . And as it was not found

there, the fact that the alleged cause of action arose in New York is
inimaterial."
To speak of the corporation being present is to use a mere
figure of speech. In a strict sense a corporation cannot be present
in foreign territory. The state which conferred certain powers on
a group of natural persons to act as a unit and to hold property
and transact business under a given name, etc., can of course exercise
control over this fictitious person. And when its activities extend
sufficiently into foreign territory, sound policy demands that the
foreign state be able to enforce claims against it.
If such an organization does nothing whatever in a foreign
state, there is no conceivable reason why that state should have
power to exercise control over it, merely because it may be able to lay
hands on the individuals who carry on its activities elsewhere.
If, for example, a New York corporation did nothing in New
Jersey, there is no policy which would make it socially desirable
for the courts of New Jersey to attempt to deal with it, though
every one of its officers might live in New Jersey and commute
back and forth every day.
If the corporation extends its activities to a considerable extent the policy, is everywhere recognized that it is desirable that it
should be subject to the jurisdiction of the state where such business is done.

2. Minnesota Assn. v. Benn (1923) 261 U. S. 140.
3. Goldey v. Morning News (1894) 156 U. S. 518; Philadelphia &
Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibben (1917) 243 U. S. 264; Bank of North Anerica
v. Whitney Nati. Bank (1923) 261 U. S. 171.
4. Rosenberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 516.
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But it may do a good many things in foreign territory before
the necessity for foreign control is recognized.
It may advertise its business, 5 and possibly even solicit business by agents, 6 without creating sufficient reason 7for local control.
It may buy supplies- and stock for its business.
It may deposit money in a local bank, and receive payment
of demands due it at such bank." Where the line should be drawn
is a difficult problem, the solution of which is beyond the scope
of this note.
But when it is conceded in a given case that the thing being
done by the foreign corporation is not of sufficient importance to
justify local control, then it seems clear that the fact that the corporate officer or agent is there for the purpose of such a transaction
gives no additional reason for the exercise of local jurisdiction.
On the second proposition, that the subsequent plea and trial
on the merits did not waive the objection properly made and saved,
the case follows the well settled federal rule."
On this general question there is a curious inconsistency in the
Illinois decisions.
When the objection is taken by plea in abatement they follow
the federal rule.' 0
But when the objection is taken by motion as in Harkness v.
Hyde, a subsequent plea in bar operates as a submission to the
jurisdiction."
It is difficult to see the reason for this distinction.
E. W.

HINTON.

LOCOMOTIVE BOILER INSPECTION ACT-INTERSTATE COMMERCE
AND STATE POLICE REGULATION-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INDuSTRIAL INJURIES.- [United States] The movement toward federal-

ism in American public law has again been given impetus at the
hands of the United States Supreme Court, this time with respect
to how far Congress may legislate concerning equipment of locomotives which may use the interstate rail highways of the nation.
In Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.' three separate actions were
brought to enjoin the enforcement of two state laws imposing requirements upon interstate rail carriers relative to equipment of
locomotives within the state, the contention being that Congress
having legislated with respect to the subject matter, even though
not having passed specific rules, as a consequence such state statutes
5.
6.
(1906)
7.
8.
9.
10.

Philadelphia & Readig Ry. Co. v. McKibben (1917) 243 U. S. 264.
Minnesota Assm. v. Benn (1923) 261 U. S. 140; Thurman v. Ry.
151 N. E. 63; Shambe V. D. and.H. R. R. Co. (Pa. 1927) 135 At. 755.
Rosenberg v. Curtis Broun Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 516.
Bank of North Averica v. Whitney Nati. Bank (1923) 261 U. S. 171.
Harkness v. Hyde (1878) 98 U. S. 476.
Delaney v. Clenwnit (1841) 4 Ill. 476; Grand Lodge v. Cramer

(1896) 164 Ill 9.

11. Eddleman v. Traction Co. (1905) 217 Ill. 409.

1. 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207.

